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Abstract 
Fraudulent transactions occurring via the Internet or Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) present a considerable 
problem for financial institutions and consumers alike.  Whilst a number of technological improvements have 
helped reduce the likelihood of security breaches, users themselves have an integral role to play in reducing 
technology mediated fraud. This paper focuses on the role of the user, specifically capturing information about 
their perceptions and behaviour when using technology to complete financial transactions. Semi-structured 
interviews with twenty-nine participants were conducted to increase knowledge and understanding in this 
domain. The findings are guided by the components of the Health Belief Model (HBM) which is used as a 
framework for exploring critical issues associated with behavioural change. Results indicate that users typically 
felt safe and secure whilst conducting financial transactions online and at the ATM. The users’ perceived level 
of threat was low mainly because they thought it unlikely that they would be a victim of fraud and because of a 
reduced sense of responsibility for any negative outcomes. Whilst users were aware at a superficial level of what 
fraudulent activities take place they were less sure about behaviours designed to counteract fraud and their 
potential efficacy. Furthermore, security concerns among ATM users were not as high as concerns among 
Internet users with Internet users appearing to take more individual responsibility for their more personal 
technologies in more private spaces. The paper concludes with some practical implications based around the 
HBM suggesting user focused ways forward for encouraging secure behaviour. 
Keywords: Security perceptions, behaviour change, Internet, ATM, technology mediated communication, 
Health Belief Model 
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1. Introduction 
 
Millions of financial transactions are conducted every day through technology as users 
interact with the Internet and Automated Teller Machines (ATMs). The convenience and 
efficiency these technologies provide is countered by the novel and unique methods available 
to defraud the user through the very same technology.  
 
Until recently attention has focussed on technological improvements and interventions as a 
way of countering fraud and reducing the likelihood of security breaches. This however, has 
led to a situation in which technology constantly has to react to the changing nature of 
fraudulent activity. The introduction of Chip and PIN or EMV cards has succeeded in 
reducing fraud via lost and stolen cards but at the same time has led to an increase in card-
not-present fraud (UK Cards Association, 2011). In response, the banking industry has 
introduced additional technological countermeasures including 3-D secure commonly known 
by its brand names Verified by Visa and MastercardSecurecode, however this technology is 
also not without issues (see Murdoch & Anderson, 2010 for a discussion).  Other potential 
technologies for fraud reduction include biometric authentication and improved Internet 
protection software.  However, there remains a degree of uncertainty surrounding the 
motivation for technology related countermeasures with some researchers suggesting that the 
banking industry’s aim to shift liability onto its consumers is the key driver of these 
advancements (Bohm et al, 2000; Murdoch et al, 2010). Despite this there is some agreement 
that users themselves are an important and often neglected factor in improving security 
behaviour where financial transactions are concerned. Users have previously been labelled 
the “weakest link in the security chain,” Schneier (2000) highlighting the importance of 
taking user issues into consideration. Similarly, Sasse et al (2001) discuss transforming the 
‘weakest link’ in the security chain in a process where designers and security professionals 
move away from simply blaming users for insecure behaviours and move towards identifying 
these behaviours and designing effective systems accordingly. Consequently there is a 
growing move towards a more user-centred approach to reducing fraud which has seen, inter 
alia, the introduction of ATM best practice guidelines and warnings, online visual security 
cues as well as research into the cognitive, social and cultural issues associated with different 
user populations in relation to financial transactions (De Angeli et al., 2004; Liu et al, 2007). 
 
Given the prevalence of fraudulent activity, relatively little is known about users’ security 
awareness or the security behaviours they employ when they use technology to complete 
financial transactions, this is particularly apparent in relation to ATM use. In addition there is 
no clear way of mapping this information onto actual security issues so that practical 
suggestions for improving secure behaviour can be made. In this paper then we propose using 
the Health Belief Model (HBM) (Rosenstock, 1974) as a way of understanding users’ 
attitudes and behaviour in this context. This will extend our current limited knowledge of 
Internet based security behaviours and for the first time provide a way of mapping ATM 
users’ knowledge and perceptions onto a behaviour change model. Understanding the factors 
associated with secure behaviour use in relation to the Internet and ATMs allows a clearer 
picture of users’ understanding of their role in fraud and security and allows us to generate a 
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number of practical implications based on the behaviour change literature. The rest of the 
paper is organised as follows. Firstly we present an overview of the nature and scale of the 
fraud problem with respect to the two technologies. We highlight the fact relatively little is 
currently known about users’ perceptions, and present an overview of the banks’ position 
with regard to fraud and liability. We document the existing user centred approaches to fraud, 
highlighting issues of authentication and usability. Secondly we present our empirical work 
based on interviews designed to elicit detailed information about the users’ perspectives and 
practices in relation to ATM and Internet use. Finally we discuss the implications of these 
results in relation to the HBM and make a number of practical suggestions for improving 
practices in relation to the literature on behaviour change.  
 
1.1 Background 
 
Both ATMs and the Internet offer the user convenience, flexibility and a sense of control 
when carrying out financial transactions. ATMs allow users to withdraw cash, and perform a 
variety of other transactions, at a range of locations both during and outside normal bank 
opening hours (Payments Council, 2010).  Likewise, the Internet allows users to bank or shop 
24 hours a day from the convenience of their own home. As vehicles for financial 
transactions, however, ATMs and the Internet are both susceptible to misuse and abuse. 
Despite their similarities in terms of access and convenience the two differ in a number of 
distinct ways including longevity and familiarity, location of use and the threat types to 
which they are vulnerable. This section introduces the technologies in relation to secure 
behaviour. It also examines the relevant types of fraud and their prevalence rates, usage 
statistics and the threat in relation to banking industry policy. 
 
Over the last forty years users have become familiar with the functional design of the ATM 
as well as its operating procedures. ATMs are predominantly used to complete financial 
transactions, with the Payments Council indicating 85% of all cash acquired by individuals 
occurred via an ATM in 2009 (Payments Council, 2010).  Importantly, any transaction 
conducted at an ATM requires the user to insert his/her card and enter the correct PIN, and it 
is the disclosure of such information that has the potential to incur fraudulent activity. 
 
ATM security can be broadly considered in three categories which consist of physical attacks, 
ATM fraud, and software and network attacks (GRGBanking, 2011).  Early ATM security 
was concerned with preventing physical attacks on the actual machines.  ATMs were broken 
into and attempts were made to steal entire machines, or they were sealed with silicon and 
broken open using explosives.  These types of attacks are now countered with dye markers or 
smoke canisters which deny the thief the money inside the machine by rendering the cash 
unusable if opened by force (Curran & King, 2008).  Security of ATMs has now moved on to 
consider threat via technology, which is much more subtle and increasingly difficult to detect 
as opposed to its physical counterpart.  Software and network attacks have occurred more 
recently, with the first known malware attack on an ATM in 2008 (TrustwaveSpiderlabs, 
2009). Such attacks focus on the ATM network and its bespoke applications rather than 
attacking the ATM user, and as such are beyond the scope of this paper. More traditional 
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ATM fraud is targeted at user behaviour, with criminals employing a number of different 
methods in order to obtain cash, or more typically obtain card and/or PIN details fraudulently 
from an ATM user.  GRGBanking (2011) outline the common types of ATM fraud which are 
described below: 
1. Card-trapping – A device is placed on the card reader that traps the card.  When the 
user leaves the ATM the criminal will remove the device and obtain the card.  Even if 
the user attempts to ‘Cancel’ the transaction, the criminal can still obtain the card and 
use it in conjunction with another type of attack, such as PIN capture or card-not-
present fraud. 
 
2. Skimming – Typically, illegal devices are attached to the card-reader that enables the 
criminal to record the data from the magnetic stripe.  The user’s PIN is recorded either 
by shoulder surfing, by using a hidden camera, or keypad logger.  They then 
reproduce the card and use it to withdraw cash from the user’s account.  To note, 
skimming was reported as the top global threat for ATMs in 2012 (ATMIA, 2012). 
 
3. PIN capture – This technique is typically used in conjunction with another technique 
such as card-trapping or skimming.  It can be achieved by shoulder surfing which 
involves the criminal observing the user input their PIN and subsequently acquiring 
their card, which can include distraction and pick pocketing.  Hidden cameras can 
also be attached to machine or surrounding area which observes PIN entry or keypad 
loggers can be attached to the keypad of the ATM which records the entry of the PIN. 
 
4. Cardholder-Not-Present (CNP) – CNP fraud typically occurs when a card is 
fraudulently obtained and then used over the telephone or Internet where a PIN is not 
required.   
In terms of prevalence, the European Central Bank (ECB; 2012) report fraud statistics for all 
European countries in the single euro payments area (SEPA) which includes all EU member 
states as well as Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.  In 2010 card fraud totalled 
€1.26 billion, which represents 0.04% of the value all card transactions and 16% of this fraud 
occurs at an ATM.  On average this amounts to €1.73 lost for every card that is issued, which 
is greater than the average transaction value.  ECB (2012) also report fraud figures in relation 
to transaction volume, which indicates 1.2% of all cards issued were affected by fraud and 
represents 0.018% of transactions in 2010, with 31% of this occurring via ATM.  Further to 
this, ECB (2012) report a comparison of fraud volumes with fraud values which reveals that 
ATM fraud involves larger losses per transaction than any other transaction channel (e.g., 
POS or CNP). 
 
The UKCA (2012) states the total losses due to plastic card fraud in the UK for 2011 to be 
£341 million, which is a dramatic decrease of 52% from 2008 where losses peaked at £609.9 
million.  Fraud losses in relation to total turnover have also fallen considerably since 2008 
and now represent 0.061% in 2011.  More recently fraudulent attacks  have targeted outlets 
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where the card is not required to complete the transaction, with a considerable 65% of losses 
accounted for by card-not-present fraud, in contrast to counterfeit fraud which now only 
accounts for 11% of all losses.  
 
A survey by CPP (January 2011) indicated that 13 million people in the UK have now fallen 
victim to card fraud with one-third of them not being aware of the attack until being informed 
by their bank. Seven per cent of people in the survey also reported suffering from card fraud 
in the last 12 months down from 10% in the previous year. The same survey also indicates a 
number of geographical hotspots for fraudulent attacks, with Brighton, London and 
Manchester topping the list in the UK. Overall, the UK has a greater proportion of card fraud 
victims than most other major countries, with only China having a greater proportion (ACI 
Worldwide, February, 2011). 
 
To put these figures into perspective 30 million people use ATMs every month in the UK 
(PayPoint, 2013) and in January 2013 239 million transactions were made via the LINK 
ATM network (Link, 2013). Given the high levels of ATM usage worldwide it is perhaps not 
that surprising that people report being relatively unconcerned about ATM security.  A 2006 
survey suggested that 19% of ATM users indicated they were not concerned about security 
when using an ATM and 68% would continue to use ATMs as they normally would despite 
being aware of the possibility of fraud (NCR, 2006). However, a more recent survey suggests 
bank card fraud is the number one security concern among respondents, closely followed by 
identity theft (Unisys Security Index, 2011).  This increased concern may be related to a shift 
in liability as the banking industry attempts to move responsibility for fraud and security onto 
consumers (see Murdoch, 2013). If the bank can show that a customer has been ‘grossly 
negligent’ (a term the bank is free to define themselves) then the full liability shifts to the 
consumer. Gross negligence may range from failing to take all available steps to keep the 
card and the PIN safe at all times; to a more recent edict that customers must have different 
PINs for separate cards (Lewis, 2012). As banks continue to shift liability onto consumers it 
becomes increasingly timely to investigate users understanding of security, threat and 
responsibility in respect to their financial transactions. 
 
Defrauding the user online takes a number of different forms with some being more amenable 
to secure user intervention than others. Whilst malware and spyware infiltrate the user’s 
system collecting the user’s data relatively unobtrusively to some extent these attacks happen 
behind the scenes/in the background and require less active user involvement at the point of 
attack. By comparison phishing attacks play on user’s involvement with websites often 
relying on their familiarity with a particular website in order to spoof it, thus the importance 
of the user in relation to secure behaviour is paramount in this kind of attack. Relatively less 
is known about secure user behaviour in relation to phishing attacks, which some research 
focusing on phishing toolbars (Zhang et al., 2007) however; again this allows the user to pass 
responsibility to a technology-based countermeasure.  It is already known that users will 
ignore warnings given to them by such toolbars (Wu et al., 2006) and therefore the actual 
user behaviour remains central to the issue of fraud prevention. 
6 
 
Phishing attacks typically occur with emails and websites that fraudulently mimic legitimate 
organisations in attempt to harvest personal and financial information from the user.  In the 
past 10 years phishing methods have become much more prevalent and sophisticated and 
Abad (2005) indicates that phishing attacks are rarely committed by a single individual but 
usually by a number of people who specialize in different techniques. The UK Cards 
Association (2011) report total losses associated with online banking fraud of £46.7m in 
2010, a decrease of 22% since 2009.  Online banking fraud typically arises from scams 
including spyware and phishing attacks.  The Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) reports 
on phishing activity trends, and the December 2010 report indicates financial services are 
targets for 55.1% of all phishing attacks, with payment services accounting for a further 
24.9%.  Further to this, the Internet accounts for 59% of all CNP-based fraud and a 2010 
international survey suggests 10% of people polled had been victims of online scams, 9% 
taken in by phishing and 7% subject to online credit card fraud (Norton, 2010). In the UK the 
number of people reporting having had their credit card details stolen online has increased 
threefold during the period 2003-2009, from less than one percent to over three percent, and 
in the year 2009 20% of survey respondents reported having been asked to provide their 
banking details to non-banking websites (Blank& Dutton, 2011). 
 
Again, to put this in context, over half the UK population now bank online (UKCA, 
November 2012) and many report in surveys feeling confident about doing so. It is also 
reported that 836 million card payments were made online in 2011, which represents £63 
billion spent via plastic cards in this domain (UKCA, 2011).   When trying to understand 
users attitudes and behaviour with respect to security practices researchers have attempted to 
describe the kinds of mental models that users hold about different computer security risks. 
Wash (2010) suggests that users hold inaccurate mental models or folk models of computer 
security. These mental models may differ from security experts’ mental models so that 
experts may think of password loss as resulting from more malicious activities whilst non 
experts perceive password loss as closer to the risk of a naive or innocent loss of a key 
(Camp, 2009). Wash (2010) also suggests that many users attempt to avoid security decisions 
altogether choosing to pass the responsibility for security to some external entity. This could 
mean shifting the responsibility onto a technological entity such as a firewall or virus 
protection software, a social entity i.e. another person or IT technician, or another institution 
such as the bank. 
Nevertheless, the literature on e-commerce suggests that security concerns are the most 
common factor affecting adoption of online banking (Booz et al, 1997; Daniel, 1999; 
O’Connell, 1996; Sathye, 1999). Security concerns remain important for existing users of 
online banking services. The Gartner Group (Litan, 2005) found 28% of online banking users 
indicated their banking online was influenced by online attacks, with 4% of users no longer 
paying bills online and 1% refusing to use online banking again.  Similarly, the adoption of 
online shopping appears to be predominantly affected by issues of security and privacy of 
information with such concerns playing a major role in the consumer's willingness to 
purchase goods online (Culnan, 1999; Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 1998b, 2000).   
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Despite frequent references to the importance of security concerns, these concerns do not 
always translate into actual behaviour and may not be sufficient to inhibit technology 
mediated financial transactions. We know, for example, that users will put their concerns 
aside if the benefits of using the Internet are made pertinent (Spiekermann et al, 2001). This 
can lead to insecure behaviour which leaves the user open to fraudulent attacks.  There have 
been a number of studies investigating the dichotomy between attitudes and behaviour 
towards security online (Acquisti, 2004; Acquisti & Grossklags, 2003; Shostack, 2003). A 
number of explanations have emerged, including a lack of information about the problems 
and countermeasures, and low privacy sensitivities. Any future research needs to consider the 
factors which can contribute to the adoption of secure behaviour which are more carefully 
matched to the security concerns that are expressed. 
 
Considering the two technologies side by side there are some notable differences with respect 
to fraudulent activity. Firstly, the location of the technology itself means that for ATM users, 
predominantly accessing banking services in public spaces, the issue of safety is more 
tangible with users on their guard against observation,- shoulder surfing and even physical 
attack (Goucher, 2008; Keizer, 2005).  In contrast, the Internet is typically accessed from a 
private or, at least, personal space on a personal computer within a domestic environment, 
thus affording the user more time to carefully consider their transactions.  Being in one’s own 
home may however confer a false sense of security allowing the user to feel unduly ‘safe’ and 
potentially act in a less than secure manner online. Finally, the timing or sense of immediacy 
surrounding the threat varies between the two technologies.  ATM fraud can occur regardless 
of whether or not the victim completes the transaction. The victim’s details can be illegally 
harvested as soon as they have entered their card and PIN.  Whilst Internet fraud can also 
occur with minimal user interaction (e.g., malware or spyware attacked) it is also possible for 
a fraudulent attack to only be rendered successful once the user has completed the online 
transaction and disclosed login details and/or financial information (e.g., in the case of 
phishing attacks).This means that in some instances, there are potentially more opportunities 
for the Internet user to spot fraudulent signs and behave in a vigilant, proactive manner with 
regard to security as the transaction progresses. In contrast, the ATM user often has to act 
retrospectively in response to fraud. 
1.2 The problem of security from a user perspective 
 
As previously discussed approaching the problem of security from a purely technological 
standpoint misses the importance of the user in the security chain. Technology designed 
without thought to the user’s cognitive, social and cultural understandings is likely to fail in 
its objectives and increase the likelihood of users acting insecurely. The growing recognition 
of the importance of taking a user perspective on security can be seen within a number of 
areas of ATM research. These include the design of navigation menus (Curran & King, 
2008), improved usability and user experience (Camilli et al, 2011), user’s perceived physical 
privacy (Little, 2003; Little et al, 2005), and authentication mechanisms (e.g., De Luca et al., 
2010; Renaud & De Angeli, 2004). The issue of authentication has received considerable 
attention in recent years. ATMs use a combination of token-based and knowledge-based 
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authentication, with a plastic card required to satisfy token-based authentication and personal 
identification via PIN to satisfy knowledge-based authentication.  Knowledge-based 
authentication has come under scrutiny due to the cognitive load imposed upon users to 
remember and recall any number of PINs and passwords which can be easily forgotten 
(Renaud & De Angeli, 2004).  This leads users to manage their PINs and passwords 
negligently (Proctor et al., 2002), typically using simple words or biographical information, 
or using the same password for multiple accounts (Ives et al., 2004). Furthermore, Cheswick 
and Bellovin (1994) suggest weak passwords are the most common cause of security 
breaches.  This may be due to lack of awareness relating to good practice for secure PIN and 
passwords, alternatively it may be due to the usability-security trade-off that often exists and 
has been investigated in the literature (Chiasson et al, 2007; Sasse et al, 2001; Yan et al, 
2004).  Alternatives to PINs and passwords have been proposed as a way of increasing the 
security of the ATM authentication process. These have centred on biometric measures as a 
technological solution to the authentication of individuals (Coventry, 2005). Biometric 
measures include fingerprinting and iris, retina and voice recognition. In user studies 
participants favoured iris verification over PIN believing it would be more secure, more 
reliable and faster (Coventry et al, 2003), although concerns over privacy persist (Coventry, 
2005).   
 
Improving authentication techniques may assist genuine users to gain legitimate access to the 
ATM whilst improved designs in terms of accessibility and privacy may encourage use and 
satisfaction. These steps alone, however, fall short of protecting users against security threats 
in the form of skimming and any subsequent card not present fraud. Understanding more 
about users’ perceptions of the security risks surrounding ATM use and their subsequent 
behaviour (secure or otherwise) is a first step towards designing for improved secure 
behaviour. There are a number of strategies a user can employ to help reduce the threat of 
fraud when using an ATM, such as protecting PIN entry and checking the exterior of the 
ATM before use, as suggested by a number of ‘best practice’ guidelines (e.g., LINK; 
Safecard; Financial Fraud Action UK).   
User centred issues are also apparent when considering the problem of Internet related 
security. Hu and Dinev (2005) indicate evidence to suggest that people avoid using 
protective, anti-spyware software due to issues surrounding its perceived ease of use and 
perceived control.  There are a number of best practice guidelines for financial transactions 
online, such as ensuring the PC is protected using anti-virus and firewall software, and 
assessing the credibility of websites using visual indicators such as the padlock security icon 
and web address (e.g., Financial Fraud Action UK; getsafeonline.org). Similarly, security 
toolbars have been developed (e.g., SpoofGuard toolbar; Chou, et al., 2004) that aim to 
identify phishing websites.  However it is noted that users can still be fooled by attacks when 
they implement the security toolbars and even ignore the warnings such toolbars provide 
(Wu, et al., 2006).  More recently Murdoch & Anderson, (2010) have noted that 
technological solutions to card-not-present fraud such as 3Dsecure actually undermine the 
users own security practices and training by forcing them to enter sensitive details on a third 
party site.  This further highlights the importance of considering user behaviour as a primary 
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concern, whether it be for the purpose of understanding how we can motivate users to adopt 
protective technologies (Dinev et al, 2009) or for the purpose of understanding how we can 
motivate users to behave more securely without relying so heavily on technological 
countermeasures, such as Chip and PIN or protective software technologies.  
 
From a bank perspective there are inevitable costs associated with insecure user behaviour.  
However, Myers (2007) explains that the costs of phishing are not simply the direct losses 
associated with the crime, but also the indirect and opportunity costs that are incurred.  
Indirect costs are those which do not arise from stolen money or goods but are incurred from 
dealing with the problem, such as call centre costs and customer service.  For example one of 
the top 20 banks in the U.S. is reported to have fielded 90,000 phone calls per hour for five 
hours following a phishing incident in February 2004 (Krebsbach, 2004).  These indirect 
costs are not only associated with staffing time and costs but also branding.  The Anti 
Phishing Working Group (APWG) estimates that $100,000 to $150,000 is lost in brand 
devaluation per attack.  Another cost to banking organisations manifests in lack of trust or 
apprehension of adoption a user may exhibit following a fraudulent attack.  The Gartner 
Group (Litan, 2005) survey indicates online banking user interaction is affected by known 
fraudulent attacks. 
It is possible that some of these costs can be offset by the benefits obtained by widespread 
use of technology for banking transactions, which provides a self service driven system that 
does not have to be staffed at a physical outlet and can be more profitable for the banking 
industry (Christoslav et al., 2003).  It is also possible that such costs can also be reduced by 
the shift of liability onto the consumer that will reduce direct costs of fraud (Murdoch et al., 
2010), but are unlikely to reduce the indirect costs noted.  Therefore, it is not surprising that 
financial institutions have invested in technological countermeasures that can help to reduce 
fraud or shift liability in order to reduce their own costs. 
In summary, despite the development of technological solutions to the problem of Internet 
and ATM fraud, the amount of money lost to these activities is still substantial, with 
considerable numbers of people still becoming victims of ATM/card and online financial 
fraud. The real threat of fraud and its mechanisms vary between the two technologies, as does 
the way in which people engage with the technologies in terms of location and the sense of 
public and private use. The ultimate aim is to explore users’ attitudes towards secure 
behaviour and understand factors which might support or discourage users from engaging in 
secure practices across the two technologies. Drawing on the behaviour change literature 
within health psychology, the HBM provides us with a framework for exploring these factors 
with a view to supporting secure behaviour.  
1.3 Using the health belief model as a way of understanding users’ financial security 
behaviour 
The HBM is a psychological model that attempts to explain and predict health behaviours. 
The original model (Rosenstock, 1974) was based on four constructs: perceived 
susceptibility, perceived severity, perceived benefits, and perceived barriers. These concepts 
10 
 
were proposed as accounting for people's "readiness to act." In more recent versions of the 
model the concept, cues to action, has been added with the notion that cues would activate 
that readiness and stimulate overt behaviour. Another recent addition to the HBM is the 
concept of perceived control which is a measure of level of self-efficacy, or one's confidence 
in the ability to successfully perform an action. Although devised to examine behaviour 
change within a health setting (see for example, alcohol use [Minugh et al, 1998; Von et al, 
2004], smoking [Von et al, 2004], drug use [Bonar & Rosenberg, 2011; Welch, 2000], 
exercise [James et al, 2012; Wouters et al, 2009] and medical screening behaviours [Austin et 
al, 2002; Yarbrough & Braden, 2008]),the model is flexible enough to usefully explore 
different domains and table 1 demonstrates how the HBM can be considered within a 
financial security context.   
In recent years researchers from a wide variety of domains have been adopting and modifying 
behaviour change models rooted in health psychology  such as protection motivation theory 
(PMT) (Rogers, 1975), implementation intentions (Gollwitzer 1999) and the HBM 
(Rosenstock, 1974) as a way of explaining and predicting behaviour in their respective areas. 
These include energy (Bell et al, in prep) and computer based security within workplaces (Ng 
et al, 2009) and Internet security (Davinson & Sillence, 2010).  More specifically, Ng et al 
(2009) use the framework of the HBM to design a measure of secure user behaviour in a 
workplace setting and find perceived susceptibility, perceived benefits, and self-efficacy to be 
significant determinants of user behaviour in relation to email attachments.  In addition, 
Davinson and Sillence (2010) consider the role of perceived susceptibility when developing 
interventions to promote secure behaviour in relation to phishing attacks. 
Although the HBM has been used previously in relation to phishing (see for example 
Davinson & Sillence, 2010) this paper extends its application by firstly considering Internet 
use in broader everyday terms and secondly by considering its suitability in the context of 
ATM use. To our knowledge this is the first paper of its kind to focus on ATM user security 
perceptions in relation to this model of behaviour change. The review above indicates a 
number of differences between ATMs and the Internet in relation to security behaviour and a 
further aim of this study is to examine whether or not the HBM allows these differences to be 
categorised in relation to potential behaviour change strategies.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Overall aims and approach 
The broad aim of the study is to contribute to our understanding of users’ awareness of, and 
behaviour towards, financial security. More specifically, the study aims to evaluate an 
appropriate framework, based on the HBM constructs, for addressing the issue of technology-
mediated fraud from a user perspective.  The study also aims to determine whether this 
framework is appropriate to investigate user behaviour for both ATM and Internet 
technologies.  It is expected that an understanding of these issues will identify the key areas 
for improvement and inform behaviour change strategies. To this end a series of semi-
structured interviews were carried out with ATM and Internet users. The aim is to unpack the 
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issues associated with secure behaviour in both domains through an analysis that is driven by 
the factors of the HBM. 
2. Method 
 
Interview design and procedure 
The semi-structured interviews focussed on how the user interacts with technology to 
complete financial transactions as well as user knowledge of security issues and associated 
risks. Questions included: What are you concerned about when using technology to complete 
your financial transactions? How do you alleviate any concerns you have?  How do you think 
you will be affected if you became a victim of fraud? What measures do you think can be 
taken to prevent fraud? 
Prompts and questions were used throughout the interview but participants were able to 
develop their own topics of conversation as appropriate. Participants were made aware that 
although there were a number of topics of interest to cover, it was perfectly acceptable to 
deviate from these questions and discuss anything else they felt was relevant. The interview 
was recorded using a digital mini disc player and the typical duration was between 30-45 
minutes.  
 
Participants  
Twenty nine interviews were conducted, with fourteen females (mean age 51.9 years) and 
fifteen males (mean age 50.1 years) agreeing to take part. All participants were recruited from 
the Northumbria University, Psychology and Communication Technologies (PaCT) lab 
database. The PaCT lab database contains contact information for a range of potential 
participants from the general population, and is therefore not restricted to a University 
population sample.  Letters were sent to 100 members of the database outlining the nature of 
the study and the inclusion criteria. All participants were required to have used ATMs and the 
Internet to complete financial transactions within the last six months. All participants lived in 
the North East of England, two participants were students, six were retired, and the remaining 
21were in full or part time employment. All participants were compensated for their time and 
paid £10. In addition to the inclusion criteria, one participant also reported using telephone 
banking. Most participants used the ATM for cash transactions only and convenience was the 
most important factor in determining where to use an ATM.  In terms of Internet use 
purchasing online was more common than online banking.   
3. Findings and discussion 
 
The data were managed using ATLAS.ti qualitative software and the analysis began with a 
thorough reading and re-reading of the transcripts. The coding process was guided by the 
main factors of the HBM although these codes were not used exclusively and the prevalence 
and importance of codes were still taken into account. Themes relating to the six main factors 
of the HBM were initially coded from the interviews: perceived susceptibility, perceived 
severity, perceived costs, perceived benefits; perceived control and cues to action.  
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Perceived susceptibility 
Two main themes emerged in relation to perceived susceptibility; Perception of fraud 
prevalence and Personal susceptibility.  Overall participants were aware that fraudulent 
activity takes place, and how it might happen and whilst not consistent on the prevalence 
rates they were all inclined to believe they were not particularly personally susceptible to 
fraudulent attacks. 
Perception of fraud prevalence 
In general, participants commented on how prevalent they believed fraudulent attacks to be, 
which in turn, may impact how susceptible they believe they are.  Comments in relation to 
prevalence were quite mixed, with some users considering prevalence to be high: 
“I know that it’s on the increase, I’ve seen it on the news that it is one of the biggest causes 
and that’s why the chip and PIN was supposed to have come about” 
 
Whereas others were unsure or thought that fraud prevalence was low: 
“I don’t know, I really couldn’t say how prevalent that was.  I don’t think it can be that much 
because people would be making a huge effort to stop it wouldn’t they.” 
 
More specifically, two main types of risk emerged that participants were aware they could be 
susceptible to; these were risks associated with physical safety and risks associated with 
technology security.   
Participants identified a risk to their physical safety when using an ATM in particular.  This 
type of risk included their cash or card being stolen via physical attack, and also PIN 
vulnerability via shoulder surfing.  Most commonly users referred to isolation and lack of 
privacy as being the catalyst for such risks. Comments relating to isolation indicate some 
users considered it risky to use an ATM at night, in quiet areas with low footfall, enclosed 
rather than open locations or in unfamiliar areas.  For example: 
“I wouldn’t use an ATM late at night, in an unfamiliar area, and if I saw anyone around me 
that made me uncomfortable.” 
 
However, there appears to be a fine line between too few and too many people present when 
using an ATM.  A few users said they would feel uncomfortable using an ATM if the 
environment felt too busy for example in a crowded high street.  The aspect of privacy was 
also discussed in terms of entering PINs when purchasing goods from a retail outlet, for 
instance: 
“I still think, I mean you’re always in a queue usually aren’t you, and you can’t tell me there 
isn’t somebody can look” 
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The term technology security is used to describe risks to personal finances or personal 
identity via technology, such as fraudulent attacks arising from ATM or Internet use.  
Comments regarding knowledge of risks to technology security occurred more than twice as 
frequently as comments regarding physical safety.  However these comments did refer to 
both ATM and Internet use.  Risks in relation to identity are commented upon much less than 
direct financial risks and most commonly refer to Internet use.  Users appear to be aware of 
the risk towards their identity in the form of phishing emails or purchasing goods from 
dishonest websites, for example: 
“I’ve, where I work we’ve had people use the Internet and answered spam emails in error 
and basically handed their details over.” 
 
Risks to finances via the Internet are generally noted as being due to illegitimate websites and 
completing purchases on websites that are not secure.  Financial risks via the ATM are 
recognised as being due to ATM tampering e.g. the use of skimming devices and false 
fascias, for example: 
“People who actually put a false front on the machines and therefore they read the card 
number and they can also record your PIN number so therefore they can go and use it.” 
 
Personal susceptibility 
Although participants identified types of fraudulent activity, and had a general sense of 
prevalence rates, this did not necessarily translate into a sense of personal susceptibility. In 
most cases participants reported they believed it was possible they could become a victim of 
fraud, but that they did not really feel that it was likely to happen to them: 
“Not as concerned as I should be.  I think that’s probably fair to say.  One day I’m going to 
get badly burned but I have this feeling ‘oh it’s not going to happen to me’.” 
However, a number of other factors also appear to have an impact upon personal 
susceptibility. These include familiarity, trust, and personal experience. Firstly, it appears that 
users will feel more susceptible when they are unfamiliar with the situation or the technology.  
Users were much more confident when using the ATM than the Internet and some even went 
as far as to say it was more likely they could become a victim of fraud via Internet use: 
“Internet more so because I’m just not sure about it.  ATM machines I’m not too, I’m alright 
with it, but more Internet shopping I would maybe think twice.” 
 
Likewise the perception of susceptibility is also affected by the amount of trust the user has in 
the particular transaction or technology.  Many users noted that they only purchased products 
on the Internet from reliable and well known brands, for instance: 
“I don’t think I’m particularly concerned, apart from as I say I would only use it in what I 
felt to be a reliable, with a reliable company or a sort of relatively secure situation.” 
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Users commented that when purchasing online, particularly via eBay, they will try to use 
PayPal as much as possible because they consider it to be more secure.  This leads to an 
interesting situation as being security conscious should encourage people to only use trusted 
or familiar sites paradoxically it may also provide users with a false sense of security.  
Phishing attacks commonly target well known, established and trusted brands including eBay 
and PayPal to use as the vehicle for their criminal activity.  Therefore users that consider trust 
in a brand to be a suitable benchmark for risk on the Internet may in fact increase their chance 
of becoming victims themselves. 
Additionally, drawing on personal experience and past ‘habitual’ behaviour also plays a role 
in personal susceptibility, with a reduced sense of susceptibility for participants who have not 
previously experienced any fraudulent activity: 
“I’ve never had any problems with the cash machine or over the internet so I feel quite 
secure when I’m using them.” 
“As I’ve said I’ve used ATMs ever since they came out and I’ve never had any problems with 
ATMs.” 
 
 
Perceived severity 
Participants did not see the consequences of fraudulent activity as being severe. Fraud was 
seen as less serious than many other events, partly due to the amounts of money involved, 
and partly because of the lack of perceived responsibility for dealing with the consequences 
i.e. someone/something else will be responsible/deal with the consequences. 
Participants mentioned the seriousness of fraud in relation to PINs and passwords, Internet 
purchases and ATM withdrawals.  In terms of PIN/password behaviour a minority of 
participants believed that keeping their internet based passwords secure was less important 
than keeping their PINS safe. The immediate consequences of PIN exposure were contrasted 
with the more opaque consequences of harvested passwords. Whilst PINs typically have 
financial significance, and passwords are more diverse in nature, it may be that owning 
multiple passwords, in a sense, might dilute the perceived severity of someone fraudulently 
having access to just one of your passwords. Furthermore, in terms of both Internet and ATM 
use some users felt the consequence of fraud was low because they did not perceive they had 
a substantial amount to lose: 
“And on the other hand, heck I don’t have enough money in my bank account that anybody is 
going to make a million pounds off me, so it’s not that much of a problem.” 
 
There are also a number of participants who show an overt disregard for the threat of fraud 
and choose not to implement secure behaviours despite indicating they are aware that they 
should: 
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“Even though when you’re using eBay and Amazon it says ‘make sure that the address is’, 
you never take the time to look at that, you’d have to be a right anorak to be looking for 
that.” 
 
Again this could be explained by a lack of perceived responsibility. Those that believed fraud 
was not their own individual responsibility considered the consequences of fraudulent attacks 
to be less serious. A number of participants, for example, indicated the bank would take 
responsibility and reimburse any financial costs incurred due to fraud: 
“I would definitely blame the bank if it, I mean if I hadn’t told someone my pin number or 
something and I was losing money.  I think the banks would honour that as well.” 
Perceived costs 
Participants saw a number of costs or barriers to changing their behaviour and acting in a 
more secure manner. These included convenience, time, memory load, and use of services.  
In terms of convenience, ATM users indicated they would continue with their regular habits 
and behaviours because it was more convenient than considering security implications, 
particularly in relation to location of ATM use: 
“If I’m in the town I’ll use any one like that I come to first, it doesn’t have to particularly be 
any kind of branch.” 
In a similar vein, participants indicated they want their transactions to be as quick and 
efficient as possible, and often see additional security behaviours as an unacceptable extra 
time cost: 
“Again, since I’m not that concerned about it, it doesn’t make the slightest bit of difference to 
me.  If it makes the little old lady who’s in the queue in front of me and she can get out of 
there quicker, then sure.” 
Memory concerns were raised mainly in relation to PIN and password use.  Participants often 
considered the security guidelines surrounding PINs and passwords to be restrictive in terms 
of memory costs, which often results in negligent behaviours: 
“I know that I don’t do that, but you should.  It’s just too hard to remember them all without 
writing them do and then it’s no good.” 
Finally, participants appeared to value the services delivered by technology such as ATMs 
and the Internet and due to this were reluctant to restrict their current behaviour practices, 
which could also lead to a cost of adopting secure behaviour: 
“Plus I save money by shopping around and seeing what deals are available.” 
Perceived benefits 
In contrast to the perceived costs of behaving securely, participants rarely touched on the 
possible benefits of adopting secure behaviour.  A very small number of participants referred 
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to peace of mind in knowing they had taken preventative or protective actions, such as 
choosing ATM locations more carefully, or confidence in security software and insurance 
policies. 
Cues to action 
Participants considered both long-term and short-term cues to action.  Over the longer term 
participants discussed the use of information as a way of raising awareness about fraudulent 
activity in terms of both susceptibility and severity.  This was usually achieved via 
information leaflets in relation to online banking, or media reports of ATM attacks, for 
example: 
“Well because of the recent publicity on the ATMs I’m conscious of looking to see if the 
machine is what it should be.  So newspapers and radio has alerted me to that, so I’ve taken 
that on board.” 
Short-term cues are those which occur before or during the interaction itself. A number of 
participants reported being aware of these cues, for example,  looking for security icons on 
websites, or shielding PIN entry at the ATM.  However, some cues were also reported as 
being ineffective, particularly in relation to the exterior of the ATM: 
“I’m sure some of them have a little sticker saying ‘if you notice anything suspicious about 
this cash machine’ and I thought well if it had a sort of extra slot with the word swag on it 
and a little cartoon of burglar bill then you might know what it was your were looking for.  
But if it just looks like a cash machine and you just put your card in the slot to get some 
money out, what am I supposed to look for?” 
In some cases participants did not appear to pay attention to cues, such as warnings stickers, 
because that was not a part of their habitual behaviour.  
More disconcerting still were a few comments indicating a lack of motivation to understand 
cues: 
“Well that’s the only one I know but because I haven’t really wanted to pursue it that much I 
haven’t looked into it anymore.” 
 
Perceived control 
The extent to which participants had confidence in their ability to take appropriate action can 
be broken down into three facets: Awareness of the behaviours to control fraud; 
implementation of the behaviours and; perceived efficacy of the behaviours to control fraud. 
In other words do users know what to do, do they do it and do they think it will work?  
Awareness of behaviours to control fraud 
Participants are aware of both prevention and containment actions. The term prevention is 
used to describe actions a user can take before or during the transaction which can help to 
prevent fraud. Whereas, the term containment is used to describe actions a user can take to 
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protect themselves from the consequences of fraud, and can occur both before the transaction 
and some time after, but these actions do not necessarily prevent the actual fraud from 
occurring. 
Users were aware of some preventative measures that can be taken when using the ATM and 
the Internet, and also noted preventative PIN behaviour.  In terms of the ATM, users were 
aware that PIN shielding, checking the exterior for signs of tampering, and being aware of 
surroundings, are all measures that can help prevent fraud, with PIN shielding the most 
frequently mentioned measure. In terms of Internet use participants were aware they should 
have security software, they should only visit secure sites and to a lesser degree that they 
should not respond to phishing emails. Users most frequently commented that the padlock 
icon indicates they are using a secure site: 
“Yes, at the top it’s got the h whatever it has, but it has to have an s by it.  And then you’ve 
got to have that little padlock in the bottom.” 
 
Often, however, participants’ descriptions of what they considered to be a ‘secure site’ was 
confused and vague, suggesting only a surface level understanding of this concept.  
Comments relating to knowledge of containment measures occurred far less frequently than 
knowledge of prevention measures.  Containment knowledge included awareness of checking 
bank statements and insurance policies that can protect against the consequences of a 
fraudulent attack, for example: 
“I know that everything I do, because I do quite a lot of transactions through the Internet or 
by automatic banking and at least I know what I’m doing is safe now because I have this 
policy in place.” 
 
Implementation of control behaviours 
Knowing what to do does not automatically mean that users will go ahead and implement the 
behaviours to control fraud.  Some participants, however, did note implementing a number of 
control behaviours.  In terms of preventative actions, ATM users typically reported shielding 
their PIN, checking for a safe location, and checking that the ATM has not been tampered 
with.  For example: 
“I always cover because what I find is people stand very close to you when you put your PIN 
number in.  The post office they stand right behind you.  So I always stand in front and put 
my hand across when I do the PIN.” 
 
Although most of the comments concerning prevention relate to ATM use a minority of 
participants reported preventative actions when using the Internet.  These included ensuring 
they use a computer that has appropriate security software, not responding to phishing emails, 
looking for security icons and only purchasing from trusted sites.  However, as noted in terms 
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of trust and perceived susceptibility, reliance on security icons and ‘trusted’ sites is not 
always a successful prevention strategy. 
Almost all participants said they relied upon security software and packages installed on their 
personal computers.  Most participants expressed that they would not use the Internet, 
particularly for financial transactions unless they were sure security software was in place: 
“Again, my own system, I’ve got my own security software, I’ve got my own password, I’m 
perfectly happy with it and I’m the only one that uses it, so again that says yes to me.  Using 
a common terminal, again, would just make me too uncomfortable I think.” 
 
Participants also noted generally being more cautious as a way of preventing or controlling 
fraud.  Typically this consists of using the technology in a manner or in a location that leaves 
the user feeling comfortable. In terms of ATM use this often meant using an ATM in an area 
deemed to be safe.  
 
Typically participants were cautious about how and where they used the Internet.  Some 
participants were happy to purchase online, but were not happy to bank online, which 
indicates a higher perception of risk associated with banking.  
“Well because as I say I limit my use of it and I don’t use it in what I suspect is the most 
dangerous side and that is the banking side.” 
 
Containment action was commented upon less frequently than prevention and consists of 
insurance and verification.  Containment is often implemented retrospectively such as 
checking bank statements, or is something that is put in place and requires no further direct 
action such insurance policies. Insurance does not prevent the user from becoming a victim of 
fraud but does ensure that they are protected from the detrimental consequences.  A small 
number of participants noted that they had an insurance policy to cover them against 
fraudulent activity which enables them to feel more at ease.  Whereas, verification behaviour 
consist of steps taken to determine whether or not a fraudulent attack has occurred.  This 
includes keeping receipts and checking statements carefully: 
“But I always check my bank statements and I’ve never had a problem, and if somebody did 
use it for something else you’d knobble them pretty quickly wouldn’t you.” 
 
The choice of relying on preventative or containment behaviours can reflect whether a 
participant chooses to be proactive or reactive in relation to fraudulent attacks.  The choice to 
be proactive or reactive will also be influenced by the type of risks and range of control 
behaviours known to the participant. 
Perceived efficacy of control behaviours 
Believing that carrying out the behaviours will actually control fraud is also important and 
perhaps goes some way to explaining why some users may not choose to act despite their 
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awareness of behaviours to control fraud. In particular, there is a reported sense of fatalism 
which indicates a lack of belief that control behaviours will control fraud: 
 “And we’re never going to get rid of all fraud because there’s always people who are trying 
to find ways around it.” 
 
At a more specific level participants felt that the behaviours they knew were unlikely to be 
successful if implemented. A number of users, for example, said they were aware of the 
importance of checking the exterior of the ATM before use but were not confident that the 
action would be successful in terms of controlling fraud: 
“No I wouldn’t.  Even though I’ve heard it on the news and they say watch out if something 
looks odd, but I don’t think I would know if something, I don’t think I would know.” 
Summary  
In reality, the actual threat of fraud is relatively high. Prevalence rates are increasing in some 
contexts and if it does happen the consequences can also be highly detrimental. This study, 
however, shows that the perceived threat of fraud (i.e. perceived personal susceptibility and 
perceived severity) is low, despite the demonstration of some understanding of prevalence 
and likelihood of an attack in general. Typically, people do not think it will happen to them 
and believe that it will not be their responsibility even if it does occur.  At a somewhat 
superficial level people are aware of behaviours they could use to control fraud or at least 
render it less likely but are reluctant to implement them because they appear time consuming 
and fairly impotent.  This ultimately leads to the perceived costs of secure behaviour adoption 
outweighing the perceived benefits, and can result in negligent behaviour. 
3.1 ATM and Internet technology comparisons 
A number of similarities and differences in terms of the two technologies are evident in the 
HBM analysis (table 2).  Firstly the awareness of susceptibility within the perceived 
susceptibility factor appears to be very similar across both ATM and Internet technology.  
However, there were certain susceptibilities that were more relevant to ATM use, such as the 
potential for physical attacks. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Additionally both ATM and Internet technology use were affected by familiarity, trust, and 
personal experience; however some contrasting outcomes were apparent.  Users appeared to 
be more familiar and therefore more comfortable with ATM technology compared to Internet 
technology which reduced their perception of susceptibility.  Trust appeared to be mainly an 
issue for Internet use with greater trust reducing perceptions of susceptibility.   
 
On the whole perceived severity was considered in a similar way for both ATM and Internet 
technology. In both cases the severity of consequences was considered to be quite low.   It 
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appears users consider risks associated with both technologies to be acceptable and that the 
consequences of fraud are not specifically their responsibility. There were a number of 
differences around the issue of perceived control. Users, for example, were more aware of 
what they should be doing to control their security behaviour online compared to the ATM. In 
terms of actually carrying out these behaviours, preventative controls were more common 
when using an ATM and containment controls more common when using the Internet.  This 
distinction, however, may reflect the forms of control behaviour available for the two 
technologies rather than a conscious decision to use one form over the other.  Importantly, 
users felt that the control behaviours for both technologies would be unlikely to control fraud 
successfully.  Perceived costs and perceived benefits were considered in a similar way for 
both ATM and Internet technology, with some minor differences in relation to convenience, 
which appeared to be a greater cost for ATM use, however, again this may reflect the context 
of use in the sense that transactions take place in a public space and are time limited. Cues to 
action were considered for both ATM and Internet technology in a similar way in relation to 
long-term cues, short term cues were however often considered to be ineffective for ATM 
use. 
 
4. Discussion 
The application of the HBM has proved useful in guiding our understanding of the factors 
affecting users’ perceptions of being safe and secure whilst carrying out technology mediated 
financial transactions. It has extended our knowledge in relation to a broader range of Internet 
tasks and for the first time has guided our understanding of the factors affecting security 
behaviour in an ATM context.  The findings paint a picture of users who do not feel under 
threat when using technology. The participants in this study did not feel personally 
susceptible to fraud and believed the consequences if it did occur to be insubstantial. Whilst 
users show some awareness of the kinds of techniques employed by criminals their 
knowledge is fairly high level. In terms of secure behaviours and practices users were aware 
of what they could or should do to prevent some kinds of fraud from occurring but where 
unconvinced that taking action would actually control the threat of fraud.  A number of 
differences emerged between ATM and Internet use. These differences serve to highlight 
some of the fundamental issues surrounding user security and the difficulties in terms of 
changing behaviour. 
Users reported a greater sense of familiarity with ATMs and subsequently were more trusting 
of the technology in comparison to the less familiar Internet. Participants tried to use their 
‘regular’ ATMs. They felt comfortable doing so and their interactions had become fairly 
habitual. These habitual practices, however, can stand in the way of users adopting ‘new’ 
secure behaviours. Past behaviour and habit are relevant factors in the study of attitudes, 
intentions, and future behaviours (Ouellette & Wood, 1998; Sutton, 1994).  A meta-analysis 
investigating the impact of habit on intentions and future behaviour indicates the relationship 
between past behaviour and intention was stronger when the behaviour was habitual and the 
relationship between attitudes and intention was weaker when the behaviour was habitual 
(Ouellette and Wood, 1998).  Therefore habit may be affecting the security behaviour of 
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users who behave in a set, repeated manner particularly in light of Azjen’s (2002) proposition 
that infrequent actions can also be affected by habit, such that actually not performing the 
behaviour becomes habitual. Thus, habit is not simply a product of frequency of past 
behaviour but a construct in its own right (Verplanken, 2006; Verplanken & Orbell, 2003) 
and also appears to be important in this domain. 
Without habitual behaviours to rely upon, other heuristics appear to come into play when 
users are accessing the Internet. Relying upon certain trust seals and markers (e.g. Jensen et 
al, 2005) for example underlies a number of misconceptions that users hold about their value 
in relation to security. Flinn and Lumsden (2005) found that users believed that the trust mark 
present on some websites was responsible for the site’s security.  In practice, however, this 
marker does not indicate that the site itself is trustworthy; it simply indicates the information 
in the privacy policy is adhered to, and imposes a requirement for a minimum amount of 
information to be included in the policy.   Other ‘trust marks’ that users appear to rely on are 
icons that denote the type of payment that is accepted, such as VISA and Mastercard logos 
(Jensen et al, 2005).  Again this kind of information often relied upon by users to make 
decisions about whether or not to interact with this site is unreliable in that sense and can also 
be easily spoofed by a fraudulent source. 
In terms of personal susceptibility many participants simply did not believe that a fraudulent 
attack would happen to them. This form of unrealistic optimism (Weinstein, 1987) has been 
noted in relation to other IT hazards (Sjoberg & Fromm, 2001). The longer the lack of fraud 
persists the less likely users are to believe that anything bad will happen to them. The sense 
of complacency surrounding ATM use in particular may stem from the relative longevity of 
use and in the case of most of our participants fraud free use. Interestingly, those participants 
with some experience of direct or indirect fraudulent activity showed a heightened awareness 
of security issues. 
There was a general sense amongst the participants that in the unlikely event of them 
becoming a victim of fraud then it would be the bank’s responsibility to deal with the 
consequences. Whilst not all participants were confident the bank would accept 
responsibility, there was a feeling that the fraud itself would not result in any financial loss 
for them, as some other entity existed which would reimburse them. This is consistent with 
previous research which suggests users appear to regard security as the responsibility and 
concern of the bank (Weir et al., 2009).  Dourish et al (2004) note that users frequently 
delegate security to particular organizations or financial institutions, which are expected to 
take appropriate security measures.  Therefore, this lack of responsibility could lead users to 
feel less concerned about the financial implications, and result in different or lower 
perceptions of severity.  Furthermore, their perception of susceptibility and severity appears 
to be affected by their perception of responsibility, with most delegating responsibility to 
technology or an external institution, which is also consistent with Wash (2010) who 
suggested that users avoid taking responsibility for security decisions.   
In terms of unauthorised transactions on UK issued credit cards the Lending Code (2011) 
states that unless the customer has acted fraudulently or with gross negligence then they will 
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only be liable for a maximum of £50 before they give notification of loss.  If the card is out of 
their possession and if the customer still has their card then they will not have to pay 
anything. However as previously noted individual banks are free to set their own terms and 
conditions concerning what constitutes ‘reasonable care’ and are thus beginning to shift 
liability onto the consumer.  Despite this, it is still typical for the bank, in most cases, to cover 
any losses through fraud. Whilst in the longer term people may not be financially hindered 
the participants in this study failed to mention any of the other costs associated with 
becoming a victim of this kind of fraud. Cancelling debit or cash cards, for example, can 
leave users temporarily without access to funds and there is the inconvenience of reporting an 
incident and providing any relevant documentation. There is also the inconvenience and 
frustration of waiting for any fraudulent activity on the account to be reversed or refunded. A 
stolen card can leave users feeling afraid and violated and in situations in which the user still 
retains the card there is the uncertainty associated with trying to pinpoint the specific time 
during which the card details were fraudulently obtained. Many of the participants were able 
to report a number of behaviours that could potentially control fraud and listed actions they 
‘should be doing’ in order to improve their security in relation to financial transactions.  
Whilst participants’ high level knowledge does not appear to be the problem a close 
inspection indicates that for many they are unsure as to what the behaviour actually does and  
how it works. This reduced users’ sense of control over the behaviours and left them 
wondering whether or not implementing the behaviour would have any effect at all on fraud.  
This is consistent with previous research as Flinn and Lumsden (2005) point out two main 
interpretations of a ‘secure web site’ which include the site itself as being secure and 
trustworthy, and the more technically accurate interpretation that it is the connection or 
method of transporting data that is secure (e.g., via the use of SSL technology).  Therefore, if 
the user does not distinguish between storage and transport, there are clear implications for 
the user’s understanding of which sites are trustworthy or not, as they may perceive a secure 
site to be a trustworthy site.  Although it is true that SSL protocols do provide server 
authentication, it can only go as far as determining the communication is only with the 
intended recipient, and not as far as determining the trustworthiness of the intended recipient.  
Similarly, Friedman et al (2002) found differing interpretations of the term website security.  
Therefore, although participants in the current study appeared to be aware of certain 
practices, they may not fully understand what the behaviours actually achieve. 
Internet based research also indicates that users can feel a sense of futility in terms of their 
security actions. With threats constantly changing and evolving, vigilance was seen as more 
important than security per se (Dourish et al., 2004). Moreover, if participants are not 
convinced their behaviours will reduce the threat of fraud they are unlikely to act, with 
previous research indicating the importance of self-efficacy in this domain.  Woon et al 
(2005), for example, found self-efficacy to be a significant predictor of using the security 
features on wireless networks in the home.  More recently, Rhee et al (2009) found that users 
with higher self-efficacy in relation to information security reported using more security 
software and features. Higher information security self-efficacy also related to more reports 
of security care behaviour in general in relation to computer/Internet use, and greater 
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intention to continue with such security efforts.  It also appears that past experience impacts 
self-efficacy, such that previous success is likely to increase self-efficacy and previous failure 
is likely to decrease self-efficacy (Compeau & Higgins, 1995).  Therefore, if participants feel 
their previous attempts at behaving securely have not been effective they are likely to have a 
lower self-efficacy in relation to adopting secure behaviour in the future. 
The findings highlight that users perceive there to be a number of costs associated with 
behaving securely. In relation to ATM use these costs were predominantly related to time and 
convenience. The costs of behaving securely online were seen as more restrictive with 
participants reporting difficulties with remembering different PINS and passwords. The 
usability-security trade off for PIN and password use is already well documented (e.g., 
Chiasson et al, 2007; Sasse et al, 2001; Yan et al, 2004). Passwords and PINs are the most 
typically implemented knowledge-based authentication type.  It is often recommended that 
passwords and PINs be complex and difficult for anyone else to guess.  They should be 
changed periodically and never be used for more than one access point.  However, much of 
the literature suggests users do not manage their PINs and passwords effectively and securely, 
and studies have found that users typically use simple passwords that can be easily guessed 
(Proctor et al., 2002; Ives et al., 2004).Users can also feel that increased security acts as a 
barrier to work activities, increasing the time it takes to complete tasks (Dourish et al., 2004).  
People place more value on usability and convenience than security, and only when the 
perceived threat increases will they accept more complicated processes for security (Weir et 
al, 2009). 
For those using the Internet to conduct financial transactions it is key to remember that their 
goals can to some extent be frustrated by the adoption of more secure behaviour online. A 
user may be unable to buy a certain product online if they decide to only purchase goods 
from trusted sites.  Whilst users appeared relatively well educated about security behaviours, 
they might feel less inclined to implement those behaviours if in doing so they were thus 
unable to achieve their goals. For example, people may be able to accurately list the steps 
they should take to identify a trustworthy site, but are prepared to disregard the list 
completely if the very thing they desire is only available on an untrustworthy site (Dudek, 
personal communication). For banks themselves there are obviously costs associated with 
users behaving insecurely. But any losses the industry endures through fraudulent activity are 
offset by the savings they make through the use of automated, technology driven transactions 
in terms of self service provision and online banking. In addition to the goal driven pressures 
the customer places upon themselves they are also then faced with pressure from the banks to 
use the technology.  
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The HBM has proved a useful tool for mapping users’ knowledge and attitudes concerning 
security behaviour onto useful theoretical constructs. For completeness Figure 1 reflects a 
modified HBM model which takes into account the external and internal pressures of the 
domain more clearly and it is anticipated will be used in future work in this area.  The model 
thus provides a basis for the generation of practical suggestions towards encouraging secure 
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behaviour. Outlined in Table 3, the practical implications based on our findings are 
underpinned by a number of behaviour change techniques (see Abraham & Michie, 2008). 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Implications 
The shifting nature of the problem, the relative complexity of some of the fraud types and 
technologies involved, coupled with numerous individual as well as cultural differences, 
make the issue of encouraging secure behaviour far from straightforward. There are a number 
of implications, however, which emerge from this study and are discussed below. 
It is worth noting that whilst users were typically well informed about the security risks and 
about different security measures available they were less clear about the detail of the threats 
and exactly how security actions countered these risks. Card not present fraud often leaves a 
very frail link between the users insecure behaviour  and the fraudulent outcome, making it 
difficult for the user to know which specific behaviour was the problem and therefore which 
piece of knowledge might have been helpful in preventing the fraud.  Whilst it is apparent 
that simply educating users is not the answer to this problem, spending more time thinking 
about the kinds of information users receive may have an effect, in that it might allow them to 
refine their mental models to think about how and why they are taking the action they are. It 
may also prove useful for designing training materials that transform users’ passive 
knowledge into more active behaviours,  thus encouraging the modelling  or demonstrating  
of behaviour as a behaviour change technique (Abraham & Michie, 2008) (see for example 
Sheng et al., 2007 on phishing websites).  Given that the number and variety of fraudulent 
attacks increases, it remains important that people are kept up to date so that they have the 
most recent and relevant knowledge to refer to in combination with other behavioural 
interventions. This information could be imparted at key communication points with users, 
for example, on holding screens on ATMs, leaflets included in promotional material from the 
bank and during online banking transactions. It is important to note that raising awareness 
may have undesirable consequences in terms of leaving some users feeling fearful. Increasing 
the perception of the threat is important in terms of behaviour change but overly frightened 
users may choose to cease using the technology altogether rather than modify their 
behaviours appropriately. The use of fear appeals leading to adaptive and/or maladaptive 
responses is considered extensively in the health domain as a means of behaviour change 
(e.g., Witte & Allen, 2000). Findings from that body of literature suggest that successful 
campaigns to raise awareness, yet not impede action through fear, will need to consider the 
impact of individual characteristics, such as self-esteem and importantly the perceived 
efficacy of the proposed action. 
The findings of this study have a number of implications for design. Increasing the salience 
of prompts and warnings would improve cues to action and increase perceived control. Users 
were unsure of the cues that indicated when the behaviour should be carried out, or they were 
not convinced that their actions could control the threat of fraud. Thus, it is not surprising that 
users value convenience and resort to habitual behaviours instead of more secure behaviours, 
and it is important that future design takes into account the user experience that drives 
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technology-mediated transactions.  Indeed preliminary data collected in the lab suggests that 
differences in timing and positioning of warning messages on ATM screens do not have an 
adverse effect on user satisfaction with ATM use (Davinson & Sillence, nd) and so may be a 
promising research avenue in terms of encouraging behaviour change. In the current study, 
saliency of the cues was most problematic for ATM use, and therefore ATM design could 
consider how cues to act can be optimised to be prominent and timely within the task flow of 
using ATMs. ATM technology use in particular appears to suffer from users’ habitual 
behaviours. It is therefore important to recognise the value of appropriate prompts and cues 
(Abraham & Michie, 2008). These could include recognition of a warning as part of the 
transaction process that highlights the benefits of undertaking secure behaviour, rather than 
simply proceeding with less secure habitual behaviours.  A similar course of action can be 
taken with Internet technology, whereby users can be encouraged to overcome the costs of 
secure behaviour adoption and provided with a clear focus on the positive benefits of 
practicing secure behaviour.  Saliency was less of an issue for Internet use and therefore the 
focus of Internet cues to action should be on a more accurate interpretation of what the icons 
and symbols really represent. Misunderstandings were apparent in the discussions and could 
lead users to believe they were acting securely when, in fact, they were not.  Jensen et al 
(2005) indicate the importance of creating highly visible and easily understandable trust 
markers that will lead the user to rely on the correct cues, rather than missing the legitimate 
cues and relying on superficial and/or inappropriate information. Focusing on clear and 
accurate interpretations may help reduce the perceived costs associated with secure behaviour 
allowing people to recognise that it need not be overly time consuming. Likewise reinforcing 
the benefits of behaving securely could focus on both the practical issues associated with 
avoiding time and financial costs as well as the enhancement of intrinsic factors such as a 
sense of competence surrounding security management and a feeling of contributing to the 
wider aim of reducing fraud overall. Again this requires some consistency in terms of the 
technology countermeasures in place. The simple yet effective heuristics we encourage users 
to enact online are in some instances undermined by the very countermeasures designed to 
protect them (see Murdoch & Anderson, 2010).  
The consequences of not behaving securely are still regarded as minimal, and with the 
shifting liability issue still to gain widespread visibility, increasing perceptions of 
susceptibility appear to be one of the most promising avenues for investigation.  We know 
from the persuasion literature that both the source and the message are important in terms of 
increasing persuasive content (Chaiken, 1980).Thinking about the message itself, the salience 
to the user could be increased through message tailoring in terms of location, demographics 
and individual differences, such as orientation to threat or  information processing style. 
Location tailoring may be more appropriate for ATMs and could be achieved by providing 
users with data relating to fraudulent attacks and losses in the local area. Tailoring the 
information to match individual differences has proven useful in the health domain with 
Kreuter et al., (2000) demonstrating that tailoring a message to the individual does attract 
more attention. Other studies have used tailored messages to elicit the adoption of more 
desirable behaviours (Williams-Piehota et al., 2003; Williams-Piehota et al., 2004a; 
Williams-Piehota et al., 2004b). It may be possible to personalise the susceptibility 
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information for ATM and Internet users. Personalisation could be achieved via questionnaire 
measure that could alert the user to negligent behaviours they carry out and direct them to 
more secure behaviour practices, in line with providing instruction and prompting specific 
goal setting (Abraham & Michie, 2008). 
Work in the health domain has also successfully demonstrated the power of narrative versus 
statistical material in the presentation of risk information (Green & Brinn, 2003).  In the 
security domain as well, many people use stories from friends and family about security 
incidents to shape their subsequent thinking and behaviour about security (Radar et al, 2012).  
A number of studies have recently pointed to the changing nature of expertise with the health 
domain, moving away from a designated  medical expert towards patients own experiential 
information. Patients retelling their own stories have the potential to improve knowledge, 
recall, and outcomes (see Ziebland & Wyke, 2012 for an overview).  Presenting security 
information in the form of personal experiences or narratives might help increase the salience 
of the risk message and increase users’ sense of susceptibility. Furthermore improving the 
degree of similarity between the user and the source of the narrative is likely to strengthen 
user engagement with the material (Briggs et al, 2013;Wang, et al., 2008; Winterbottom, et 
al., 2012;de Wit, Das, & Vet, 2008) making it easier to recall and more influential in terms of 
any subsequent decision making around risk and security.  In addition to this, and to tackle 
the issue of perceived severity, provision of information regarding responsibility and 
consequences can be re-iterated to both ATM and Internet users, alongside information that 
alerts the user to whether others approve or disapprove of current behaviour practices 
(Abraham & Michie, 2008). 
 
Behaviour change models are only just starting to be applied to a security context. It is not yet 
known which, if any, interventions will prove successful in promoting secure user behaviour, 
but risk perception and susceptibility in particular appears to be a promising avenue for 
further investigation. Further research in this domain is clearly necessary, despite the 
promising decrease in fraudulent activity both via ATM and Internet technology fraud is still 
occurring in these domains, and it is typically user error that introduces the threat of fraud.  
Therefore, highlighting barriers to secure behaviour adoption, using a framework such as the 
HBM, and developing interventions to overcome such barriers will ultimately aid the 
promotion of secure behaviour and help to decrease fraudulent attacks further. 
 
Limitations  
The inclusion criteria for this study meant that all the participants used ATMs and the Internet 
for online banking.  A more fine grained analysis of technology use may have revealed 
differences between the users in terms of their security knowledge and behaviours. Likewise, 
any future work utilising a larger sample size may be able to focus on an analysis by age and 
gender. Although it should be noted that no substantive demographic differences were noted 
in the current study. 
Conclusion 
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Although users show some awareness of fraud and security issues they perceive the threat to 
themselves from using the Internet or an ATM to be low. Familiarity and high trust levels 
play an important role in this (mis)perception and whilst users talk about being safe and 
secure they typically fail to implement the behaviours necessary to stay that way. Whilst this 
awareness-implementation gap is present for both ATM and Internet transactions, subtle 
differences between the two mediated environments exist.  The relative novelty of the 
Internet coupled with its use within a private space seems to confer on users a slightly 
heightened perception of the risk coupled with an increased sense of personal responsibility 
for pro-actively trying to keep fraud at bay.  Practical suggestions for promoting secure 
behaviour derived from the HBM factors have been devised for both ATM and Internet users 
and increasing the salience of the risk message has been highlighted as a promising avenue 
for further research. In conclusion the HBM appears to be a useful tool for guiding further 
research and promoting the adoption of secure behaviour in relation to technology-mediated 
transactions. 
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